For Arabs, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is still central to any other policy challenge they face, including Iran.
„Dislike of Iran will not dispel such anti-American sentiments, particularly in the wake of any U.S. or Israeli military action against Iran (the United States would be implicated either way). Such action could even lead Arab leaders who may quietly applaud an attack on Iran to distance themselves from military and political cooperation with Washington. If Arab gulf interests were harmed in the aftermath of such an operation, such as by Iranian retaliatory attacks in the Strait of Hormuz, these states would probably blame the United States as much as Iran.
Finally, the notion that the Arabs and Israelis are now tacitly aligned because of shared concerns over Iran is equally misleading. Israeli analysts and officials often note that Arab states may be just as or even more worried about Iran than they are. But rarely if ever does a conversation in the region that begins with Iran end with Iran. The issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is still viewed as a core challenge that makes more overt cooperation with Israel or alignment with U.S. policies difficult. The shared concern over Iran does not translate into shared understandings about the significance of the Palestinian conflict.
Though no Arab leader (or U.S. policymaker) is likely to believe that solving this conflict would miraculously resolve all other conflicts — and many regional leaders arguably benefit from its continued existence — its continuation and the daily images it produces on pan-Arab media affect the types of policies that these states can pursue. For Arabs, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is still central to any other policy challenge they face, including Iran. In contrast, Israeli leaders increasingly view the Palestinian conflict as a subsidiary of the Iranian challenge; the view held by past Israeli leaders such as Yitzhak Rabin — that resolving the Palestinian conflict would boost Israel's ability to confront adversaries like Iran — is rarely expressed in Israeli strategic circles today. Instead, many Israeli leaders believe that that common concern over Iran will dissipate the regional focus on the Palestinian issue.
The cables open a window into America's Middle East diplomacy, but they should not lead us to draw the wrong conclusions.”
Ami tizenhárom év alatt nem, az tizenhárom nap alatt sikerült: iszlamista felkelők megdöntötték Bassár el-Aszad hatalmát Szíriában. Korábban hatszázezer ember halt meg a polgárháborúban, a véreskezű elnök kitartott, most azonban rendszere elvesztette külső és belső támasztékait.
A volt EP-képviselő szerint az elmúlt mintegy száz évben a külső erők megtalálták azokat az ágenseket, akik belül tudtak zavart kelteni vagy idegen érdekeket megjeleníteni.
Kellemetlen az oroszoknak politikailag, katonailag kevésbé.
Az orosz erők az utóbbi hónapokban folyamatosan előrehaladtak Kelet-Ukrajnában.
Lavrov hangsúlyozta, hogy Oroszország világosan felvázolta katonai műveletének céljait, valamint a béke megkötésének körülményeit.
A főtitkár a védelmi kiadások növelésére, valamint háborús gondolkodásmód elsajátítására sürgette a szövetség országait.
Legalábbis a Dumb és Dumber – Dilibogyók és a Keresd a nőt! szerzőpárosa szerint. Akik a Dear Santa, egy családi vígjáték álcája mögött a sátánból és egy család veszteségéből csinálnak viccet.
