Werner Patzelt: There needs to be better information about Hungary abroad

Dear Professor, you have by now spent a couple of months as research director for MCC Brussels. This means you might have gotten an idea of what it’s like to be Hungarian in Brussels. How do you like it?

One does not see friendly terrain around himself, nor do they greet one with rounds of applause. As MCC Brussels, however, we do start noticing that we’re very important specifically because we represent a non-utopian and more realistic view of Europe. The minor inconveniences of the present day are a fair price to pay for getting something great done tomorrow – and in the long run as well, that’s my hope.

Would you say you’ve already had some amount of success?

We’re shooting for long-term success. However, there are two things I consider a success in the short term. For one, we have built a really good team that sticks together on a human level. And on the other hand: we have been noted in Brussels in the meantime. Nobody was expecting us there, of course. But we did feature multiple times in POLITICO, in the Holy Scripture that everyone in Brussels studies day in, day out, like Catholic clerics who study their hourly office. Our positions have seen representation there several times.

Did you gain some insights into how Hungary’s politics in Brussels, which have been everything but successful so far, could do a better job there?

This question implies that Hungary is at fault for ist uncomfortable Brussels predicament. But it’s not simply Hungary’s fault. The deepest of its many underlying causes is that many European politicians don’t appreciate or even despise the Hungarian way, shaped by Fidesz’s election victory in 2010 and the remaking of Hungary that followed. This way, Hungary constantly has to be on the defensive. A highly accurate theorem of social sciences explains what follows from this: If people define a situation as a given and then act on it, their actions have real consequences, no matter how unreal their underlying definition of the situation was. Many take it as a given that everything Hungary’s government does is bad. This pertains to everything from media policy and the electoral system to the National Creed in the Constitution and the position regarding Russia’s war in Ukraine. In these circumstances, Hungary has very limited room for maneuver – yet it could do two things better. The first thing is presence and the nurturing of presence. In this context, the decision of MCC to invest a lot of funds into establishing a Brussels branch was spot on. And secondly, I can’t help noticing that Hungarians like to be among themselves. If there is a reception anywhere, Hungarians are quick to huddle together and depart for a round of pálinka or something somewhere else.

They need to be talkative in a way that combines a clarity of positions with friendliness and and an endearing overall appearance. And one does have to speak differently to those who disagree with him than with his fans. There is no need to crack risky jokes in talking to people who think differently. It’s fine to keep that within bounds of the conversations with one’s own supporters.

A couple of weeks ago, Fidesz has gone public with its decision to join the European Conservatives and Reformists. Do you think that’s the right move?

I have always considered it a grave political mistake for the European People’s Party to banish Fidesz from ist ranks. It was a good tactical move on Fidesz’s part to then leave on their own. The Conservatives and Reformists might now be the best available haven for Fidesz.

I see this as a reasonable choice, even if it’s not the best for my taste. But maybe those over at the European People’s Party do realize one day that they have much more in common with the Conservatives and Reformists than with their current green friends.

You have recently released a book titled Understanding Hungary. In the book, you make a comparison between present-day Hungary and Bavaria, governed by the CSU from the 1960s up until 2008. How did the Bavarians do a better job at strong-handed government than Hungary? Nobody seemed to have accused Bavaria of democratic backsliding.

It’s probably not the Hungarians but the political big picture that is at fault. That picture is indeed very different from what it used to be like. To start with the uncomfortable part: the left used to write the name of Franz Josef Strauß, long-serving CSU boss and prime minister, with the SS rune. It was a recurring theme during campaigns that the victory of “fascist StrauSS” is to be prevented. Bavaria was indeed deemed a “CSU state”, and it was openly discussed how much of a democracy it really was. Willy Brandt even said that “clocks tick differently in Bavaria”, and he didn’t mean to praise Bavaria as the vanguard of progress. What he meant was that the state was governed improperly the dull folks from CSU. But then Bavaria’s gradual upward march garnered attention. It was, in fact, the 1960s and the 1970s, the time of Bavaria’s most intense positive change, when the “CSU state” was at its strongest. But apart from that,

Contempt for Bavaria only reached the extent that the dimwits on TV usually spoke Bavarian. Would you care to guess what language the chumps speak today on German TV?

They’ve got to be from Eastern Germany. Probably Saxon.

They do speak Saxon nowadays. It took the transformation from a backwater to a society of “laptops and leather trousers” to make Bavaria as well-respected as it is today. Hungary, on the other hand, launched ist transformation in 2010, when globalization, neoliberalism and a social democratic Europe was the name of the game. It was considered revolting that Fidesz even dared to defeat the Socialists. It was defeated – if narrowly – eight years before, and for long, as it was hoped. But now Viktor Orbán was back and put himself to work on fundamental reforms of the country. It was considered even more revolting that these worked. In any case, Hungary is now living in a situation in which politicians and the media harbor so much outrage about Hungary and contempt towards the politicians of the Hungarian government.

Most, at last, admit this is the case on migration policy, and more and more governments will realize that in regard to other areas of policy as well. Just like CSU needed a longer time for ist reforms to come to fruition, Fidesz needs to be in it for the long haul as well. Moreover, the Socialist elite of old was well-connected globally, so that there are anti-Fidesz NGOs, journalists and entrepreneurs everywhere who are discrediting Hungary all around. This did not happen to Bavaria, as they soon ended up receiving countrywide approval for their policy, if less so for their politicians. One thing, however, needs to be kept in check, and that is processes of corruption. Franz Josef Strauß was, throughout his life, renowned for letting things slide sometimes. If people around powerful politicians, or politicians around business barons get very rich very fast, that – rightly – gives rise to a bad reputation and personal criticism. That, then, might get in the way politically as well. Thus, the Hungarian government should behave in a painstakingly correct manner in this respect.

Let’s linger on CSU for a second. Could you imagine CSU, which had for a long time been the driver of Hungarian-German friendship and understanding between the Union parties and Fidesz, returning to this role?

I can indeed imagine that, but this is very far down the line. There would be many opportunities for action. First of all, there needs to be better information about Hungary and its policies. Most Germans have so little knowledge of this country that they usually take mere speech bubbles at face value. Everyone purports to know that Hungary persecutes homosexuals, has long done away with press freedom and the elections are definitely meddled with as Orbán couldn’t possibly get himself reelected any other way. If you make such statements in Germany, you are rewarded with nods. Such knowledge gaps about how Hungary works and what Fidesz’s policy actually is leads to an understanding between those who do not know it and those who know it superficially. And as 70 to 80 percent of the journalists in German media lean green or left, a broad conviction arises, sanctioned by the media: Hungary really isn’t kosher! This has the following corollary for CDU and CSU: as these parties are, in turn, beholden to the leftist media dominance and exposed to its attacks, they try to offer as few vulnerabilities as possible.

Secondly, a better relationship between Hungary and Germany could be brought about by the observation that many a Western political illusion is falling apart right now. Among them feature the illusionary migration policy or the belief that Russia could be defeated by way of economic sanctions. If these illusions are indeed failing, more and more people could recognize that the Hungarian approach wasn’t wrong in many areas to begin with. And in order for good relations to come about at that point, there must be as much well-maintained contact as possible. I would, in turn, recommend that Hungary not consider CSU as lost for long.

Let’s return to the book. In it, you have described Hungary in terms of a plebiscitary democracy. Is this term suited to clean up the colossal PR catastrophe caused by Viktor Orbán’s avowal of illiberal democracy?

Let’s make it clear beforehand that Hungary is no plebiscitary democracy, and that plebiscitary democracy isn’t a good thing per se. Experience says it’s best to stand on the platform of a representative democracy, but one that allows the use of effective plebiscitary instruments. One of the reasons the Swiss have such splendid household situation and so much government legitimacy is that the electorate can exert binding political influence all the time. As regards Hungary, the instrument of the “national consultations” should be better explained – it is basically the same thing that other countries plan to introduce under the moniker of “consultative referendum”. To speak to the issue of “illiberal democracy”: Orbán spoke about an “illiberal state” back then, and that is something else than the term “illiberal democracy”, a notion established in comparative political studies as a democracy that is in decay towards authoritarianism. In light of the criticism he has received, it would be important to bring to the fore what he meant at the time. What he meant was a state that doesn’t want individuals disregarding other individuals by virtue of the “law of the jungle”. Most of those who criticize Orbán would like to see similar governmental assurance of the rights of the weak. But by using the term “illiberal state”, Orbán made a communications mistake that his enemies have understandably used for years to convince those who know superficially. He has indeed tried to correct this mistake using the term “Christian democarcy”, but that doesn’t have much appeal in Western Europe anymore either. So, it should simply be made clear:

To many criticizing Hungary, this is going to appear unlikely to be true. But these are the facts.

AfD does not at all enjoy better leadership today than it did two years ago. And yet it became the second most popular party in Germany. What has changed in Germany?

Firstly, many in Germany are now recognizing that the line the current federal government tows is largely identical to that of Angela Merkel’s government, which did have good intentions but ended up having an adverse effect in many areas of policy. People start to notice that the immigration of two large cities’ worth of people each year leads to a long-term shortage of apartments, schools and teachers. The usual consequences of Merkel’s pro-green energy policy are starting to become clear. One of them is that the Green Minister of the Economy plans to subsidize energy intensive industry, lest it leave Germany. As this would lead to either higher tax rates or less government investment, the question arises in many if it would have been better to just keep the nuclear power plants running in order to have a lot of electricity for a low price.

The line of the Merkel governments once enjoyed the enthusiastic support of the majority, in part due to the strongly pro-green mass media portraying it as desirable for years. But the times of such blind trust are now over.

Secondly: CDU took a tousand oaths that it will never cooperate with AfD. The CDU made such statements in part because it so desired, and in part because the media coerced them into giving such assurances. But in the meantime, CDU has become so weak that it cannot govern in its time-tested coalition with the FDP. It has to make do with the Social Democrats and/or the Greens for the long term.

AfD, then, becomes a means of escape.

Thirdly: ever since the reunification, there is a penchant in East Germany for protest against West Germany as well as its political and business elite. They have, supposedly, imposed on East Germany their political and economic system and bereft the East Germans of the democracy they have achieved themselves. This used to be a central theme for PDS and the Left Party. The latter has for a long time received excellent election results in the places where AfD is strong today. Meanwhile, it is broadly felt that West German elites have again imposed on East Germany policies the local electorate rightly considers mistaken. The party of protest cannot, however, be the Left Party anymore as it supports, just like the Greens do, the very migration policy that lies at the heart of AfD’s rise. This is why AfD and its policy platform could fill a representation gap as if it was made for them. One votes AfD as an alternative to “the tutelage of West German elites”. East Germans say in this context that they have already seen a state fail once and have no intention to repeat this experience after 30 arduous years spent rebuilding their lives. For them, AfD is an alternative for establishment politics. All of this together perfectly accounts for the rise of AfD, in connection with the decline of CDU.

Do you see AfD itself coming to terms with the responsibility they have as the second-strongest party of the land? Is there a process of self-cleansing with respect ot people like the party’s co-leader Tino Chrupalla, who wears a tie in the Russian flag’s colors when appearing at the Victory Day reception at the Embassy of Russia?

AfD has for a long time been debating internally about the line the party should tow in order to achieve a position that would allow it to actually shape policy. To describe this using terminology devised for the Greens: there are “Fundis” and “Realos” in the AfD. The Realos have so far lost all of their battles because the Fundis were able to express the protest of many East Germans against the CDU and West Germany’s establishment elite more clearly and catchily. Also, the Realos could never show the way towards a real government role because they were marginalized by all other parties. Thus, the Fundis’ drive towards radical fundamental opposition has always appeared more plausible than the Realos’ attempt to right the wrongs committed by Angela Merkel and the German left without questioning the German federal political system altogether.

Many of their voters vote for them because they want a change in policy – how do they now get that change in policy done as a parliamentary minority?

There is illusory hope that other parties would be ready to cooperate with AfD if they won the elections or tolerate a minority government by AfD. But this is not going to be the case. So, the smart among the AfD now realize: They can keep their promise to change something about German politics only by finding ways to cooperate with CDU. In that case, it would even be easy to do so. AfD and CDU could easily find majorities for limiting immigration to Germany or reversing the Energiewende. But for one, many in the AfD don’t want to cooperate with CDU at all as they consider it a “traitor party”. And secondly, CDU cannot cooperate with AfD. Any CDU politician who shows oppenness for that would immediately be sent to a political hero’s death by the media’s crossfire. On the flipside, any CDU politician can be everyone’s darling if they fundamentally exclude any kind of cooperation with AfD.

I have for some time advocated for the following possibly exit strategy from this impasse. I do suppose that AfD’s rhetoric is manifoldly unacceptable and demagogic. AfD has also bought into political positions, the implementation of which would cause significant harm to Germany – such as the dissolution of the EU. And on top of that, there are people working in the AfD with whom it’s impossible for advocates of a pluralist democracy to cooperate. CDU has so far, in accordance with SPD and the Greens, said that it couldn’t possibly cooperate with a party that has such rhetoric, positions and people. That is fair. But how do you change this situation? Is it better to sit idly by while AfD radicalizes? Based on the above observations I recommend doing three things. Firstly, CDU should clearly state which rhetoric AfD should drop if it wants to be regarded as an acceptable party. Secondly, CDU should precisely describe the political positions AfD should change if it wished to cooperate with CDU. And thirdly, CDU should name the people, the departure of whom it would make any cooperation with AfD contingent on and state its reasons.

This wouldn’t change AfD in the short term. But the AfD’s Realos would get support from outside, which would cause tensions in the AfD. This would weaken the AfD, while its total isolation holds it together in solidarity. And precise demands toward AfD and the internal debate that would ensue could finally provide supporters and enemies of the AfD with fodder for discussion, allowing the political game to be played along the rules of a pluralist democracy. This is what CDU, a bearer of governmental responsibility, should aspire to in terms of its own role. 

One last question about the war. Hungary is in a tough spot on Ukraine especially because we can’t slipstream on Germany anymore on Russia policy, as we could do in the last decade. What is it that the German government wants to achieve in the war, what do they see as Germany’s interest?

Just like on migration policy, Germany is trying to eschew a clear debate and a conclusive decision. The most pointed statement is that it would not like to see Russia emerging victorious from this war. But it remains ambiguous what specific measures Germany should, then, be taking. To put it cruelly: Germany hopes there would continue to be enough Ukrainians to fight the war against Russia and die in it until Germany has, for its part, survived the war on Ukraine’s Eastern border. Germany does hope the Ukrainians somehow endure the war, but they aren’t willing to support this cause with more than is absolutely necessary. Many very helpful things were done, but mostly late or even too late.

Concerning Hungary: the reason it gets criticism from Germany in this regard is that many just don’t understand the Hungarian position. They don’t know Hungary is completely dependent on Russian energy supplies. They can’t grasp that for Hungary, it’s geopolitically vital to be on stable terms not just with Berlin – a proxy for the European Union – but also with Russia and Türkiye. Germans see the map of Europe only from their own perspective and can’t seemto accept that the Hungarian perspective is a different one. Anyway,

and that Hungarians have again learned to love the Russians who bereft Hungary of its chance for freedom not only in 1848 but again after 1945. Such German nonsense speaks to a lack of education on history and geopolitical illiteracy.

Photo credit: Ficsor Márton/Mandiner