The relation between Russia and Hungary exposes the most delicate part of the eastern opening. Partly because of our own decisions and partly because of unforeseen events, Hungary has drifted into a difficult, if not impossible, situation. In Ukraine, with respect to the Hungarian minority’s interests, whatever minority policies the Ukrainians put into place for the substantial number of Russians living there, the 150,000 Hungarians who live in Sub-Carpathia were and will be subject to the same policies. People who criticize the Hungarian government’s soft-pedaling on Ukraine, or our reluctance about the stronger EU line on Ukraine, forget this point and that it’s a real factor for Hungary. I would also underline that Ukraine is part of the Russian sphere of influence, from which Russia can’t let them go. In the words of Albert Gazda, “Russia needs Ukraine. The West does not. Ukraine would come at too high a price, so what the West wants is just that it not be part of Russia. Ukraine itself, from every perspective, is terribly weak.”
Russia being Hungary’s main energy supplier makes it a very important business partner; however, we have to reduce our dependency on them. This is why the expansion in Paks is questionable. Because Nabucco’s prospects remain doubtful, building South Stream would be important to our region because it would bypass troubled Ukraine. It would be what North Stream is to Germany. But a year after the annexation of Crimea, the war with Ukraine and the shooting down of the Malaysian aircraft, we have to consider these facts in a fundamentally different context. Today, any settlement reached with Russia will be looked upon with understandably wary eyes. Eventually we will have to let go of certain current policies, of course with compensation and guarantees from the EU.
*