Though Hungary has chosen not to supply Ukraine with weapons and materiel, as have many EU and NATO member states, Prime Minister Orban has operated within the general parameters of European consensus on the war. Since the summer of 2014, Hungary, even though it has repeatedly raised concerns about ends games and about overall European policy toward Russia, has not blocked the many EU efforts to sanction Russia. Whatever differences PM Orban may have with other European countries on policy toward Ukraine and Russia,
he has not broken ranks,
and that has been significant.
How do you evaluate this approach in the geopolitical context?
The problem, however, is that I do not think that Russia sees much reason to stop in light of the justification it has given for the war. A ceasefire for Russia now would mean conceding much of the territory it had taken after the 24th of February. Also, it would be hard for Putin to accept the degree of military relationship that there is between Kyiv and Washington and other Western capitals. That was exactly what Russia was trying to prevent. From this perspective,
the situation for Putin is a lot worse now than before the war.
He trapped himself from this respect. Also, on the Ukrainian side a ceasefire or a negotiated settlement is not on the agenda.
The strategic and economic interests of every major power – including of course Russia, the United States and China -- around the World can recognized in regard to this war. They are writing their own stories. The European countries, however, are exceptions. They seem to be unable to write their own stories and negotiate a ceasefire in their own continent. What are the lessons learned from this perspective of the strategic autonomy of the European continent?
I think you are right. On the U.S. side, this conflict is much further away. There are few Ukrainian refugees in the United States, and the fear of the war among average U.S. citizens is pretty small. The fight of a democracy against an autocratic Russia is a natural fit for U.S. foreign policy. So there is an American narrative of the war, and it works. Whether this narrative is true or not is another question, but the Biden administration does not have difficulty telling the story of the war to American citizens or to the world. Europe by contrast has two fundamental challenges. The first stems from the differences within Europe East-West and North-South. Sweden, Finland, the Baltic Republics and Poland have the highest level of concern: they want to see a Russia unable to make such a war in the future. This amounts to eliminating Russia from Europe as a military force. You also see Southern Europe and Western Europe where outright defeating Russia is understood to be impossible. There is a search for how some modus vivendi can be achieved, how the worst aspects of the war can be mitigated and how an endgame or ceasefire can be reached. Europe has to figure out which approach it really wants to take. The second challenge I think is greater. It is an old challenge, but it is highlighted by this war. This is the challenge of figuring out what Europe is, one of the most exciting and most agonizing questions of European history. Europe is a culture, an idea, an abstraction and that of course is the beauty of Europe. The problem is at the present moment is that Europe cannot be defined. Is Crimea Europe? Is Belarus or Russia Europe? Is Georgia or Armenia Europe? I do not think you can defend what you cannot define. For Europe to defend itself first, it first has to define itself. It will be difficult and painful, but Europe will have to figure itself out quickly because there is not ten years to figure out this question. European leadership will depend on a good answer to this question. When the question is answered, the Europe’s strategic autonomy will fall into focus. The task of definition is the challenge that will confront European politicians and intellectuals in the coming months.