It is curious to me that the idea of “strategic autonomy” now seems to be discussed more than ever in Europe, precisely at the same time that Europe has, out of fear and anger, abandoned any strategic autonomy in order the throw its lot in entirely with the United States. Of course, this is only the culmination of multiple decades in which Europe has allowed NATO to in practice come to mean a complete reliance on an American defense of Europe, while Europe – firmly believing history was over – ignored the need to be realistic about its own defense in an age of globalization. (And arguably this was the case not only when it came to military defense, but also defense in any broader sense as well: defense of strategic economic industries, defense of borders, defense of cultural norms and values, and so on).
Then, as soon as a military crisis arose, violating the end of history thesis, Europe’s instinctive reflex was to turn immediately to America and fully align itself with Washington. Which perhaps is reasonable in the circumstances. But it reflects that lack of self-confidence (and sense of agency – of being able to determine one’s own destiny) that you mention.
America also lacks self-confidence, but in our case this insecurity seems to manifest in a habit of acting out and overcompensating with aggressive and risky foreign policy decisions.
Whereas Europe seems to tend towards passivity and diffidence. It seem reasonable that Vladimir Putin took account of this weakness as part of his calculation of whether to risk an invasion, but miscalculated in terms of how significantly trans-Atlantic unity would be galvanized by the combination of both responses.
That being said, it certainly seems possible that the experience of
the war in Ukraine could lead to a permanent awakening in Europe as to the reality of dangers and difficulties of living in a history that is not over after all.
And that this could stimulate a genuine resolve to move towards real strategic autonomy. We will see.
How do you see the more realistic approach that the Hungarian Prime Minister represents in the course of the European debates?
The most striking thing to me about
Prime Minister Orban’s policy is how entirely normal it is.
By this I mean that a foreign policy which puts national, Hungarian in this case, interests first is the standard, practical sort of statecraft that used to be the predominant mode everywhere in Europe and indeed around the world, for all of history. Of course other leaders might disagree with the particulars of his policy, as they have their own national interests and concerns. But to somehow have come to see such an approach as itself something abnormal, or even inherently malevolent (as many now seem to), simply because if focuses on Hungary’s interests, is frankly bizarre. The fact that it has been is perhaps itself a sign of how badly Western thinking has been distorted by the end of history myth – or perhaps it is simply a disingenuous, quasi-imperial frustration with those who act independently.