Several extractive projects still depended on Western or Japanese technology
for either extraction or the construction of high ice-class vessels. If critical technology is not available, then even if Chinese or Indian companies are very willing, Moscow may not grant them long-term contracts to develop resource fields.
A couple of years ago you wrote a book about China’s Arctic challenge. Could you explain your findings?
It appears China is indeed interested in the Arctic, and pursues economic and political objectives in the area: participate more actively in the region’s governance and in the development of economic opportunities, resource development and shipping. Chinese extractive companies are active but, if they did sign major agreements with Russia for gas development, notably with the Yamal project, they are not the only active foreign companies nor did they take a dominant position. With the war in Ukraine,
it may be that Russia will turn more to China for capital, but Moscow is also eager to maintain an equilibrium and refrain from becoming too dependent on China.
Besides, if China is indeed interested in Arctic issues, the Arctic is not prominent on Beijing’s agenda. Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East are regions that are far more important for China than the Arctic. China is pursuing an opportunistic strategy and thus tries to play promote its interests. It did so, so far, taking into account the fears of several Arctic States that it was perceived as a threat to their national interests: it refrained from challenging Canada and Russia’s claims to their Arctic passages, abode by the transit regulations and partnered with Russian companies for oil and gas extraction while respecting regulations in Canada. Will this behaviour last remains to be seen as several observers are still convinced China is nurturing long-term objectives in the Arctic that could lead it to challenge national sovereignties in the region.