You explored the dilemma of the limits of economic globalization in your previous book, “Deglobalization 2.0.”What are these limits in your view?
Globalization and deglobalization come in alternating waves phases of strong globalization carry the seeds of their destruction, that is: such phases generate the forces that ultimately set limits and force a retreat of internationalization. A first mechanism, that operates in national economies, is that redistributing the gains from further openness to the people who lost from globalization becomes more difficult at higher levels of globalization. A second mechanism operates in the international arena, when the leading power of the time (the hegemon) deserts the rules of the game that underpinned globalization and were actually designed by its interest in an open trade and investment climate. In the early phase of globalization a smaller share from a larger economic pie may still be an improvement.
At some point the costs of being a hegemon, however, outweigh the benefits.
It is ironic, but sad, that the United States and the United Kingdom (the hegemons that helped to build a constellation in which trade, democracy and peace were reinforcing aspects of the world order) spoiled global and European governance under Donald Trump and Boris Johnson.
The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic brought to the surface the recent trend whereby global supply chains are increasingly exposed to various shocks from cyber attacks to the recent Suez crises. This also reveals the weaknesses of outsourced productions that are primary seeking low labor cost and lax regulations. What shifts might this trend generate in globalization as well as in the operations of global supply chains in your view?